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Pleasure is necessary to our well-being even if we do not follow the
hedonistic view that pleasure is only good. However, we need to
distinguish between a number of different kinds of pleasures. Plato's
attempts to do this are inadequate for our discussion of the relationship
between pleasure and education. In this paper it has been attempted to
draw the distinction of pleasures and explain the nature of each kind of
pleasures. Admitting that the distinction depends on the things and
activities with which pleasures are concerned, it is significant for
establishing the concept of 'well-being' to understand pleasure and have
it attained by the pupil in the light of her worthwhile life. Meanwhile,
the subjective and objective accounts on what is worthwhile in
education for the pupil's well-being seldom coincide. In this context,
John White's argument that autonomy is central to the good life and
Richard Peters's justification for worthwhile activity shall be examined
in terms of the nature of pleasure and its distinction.
I. Introduction
If, by surrendering a pleasure of little worth, one sees a
large pleasure, the wise man will give up the pleasure of little
worth, and look to the larger pleasure. Dharmapada 290
(chapter 21)
Pleasure is necessary to the sense of human well-being,
otherwise well-being may be distorted. By this I mean the
pleasure which the agent experiences when she is either
engaged in carrying out physical acts or in a certain state which
is in harmony with her character. Without pleasure, something
involved in the agent, whatever it is, can be recognized as a mere
burden or pain in her life. But it is also a serious problem when
trying to identify what pleasure is as an _essential part of well-
being or what is meant by pleasure as well-being. Some may see
pleasure as certain human sensations or perceptions and others
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as the outcome of ascetic self-discipline. Obviously there are a
number of uses for 'pleasure' such as personal choice, a state of
consciousness or even its own sources, and a number of
synonymous terms to 'pleasure' such as 'gratification',
'satisfaction', 'enjoyment', 'delight', 'rapture' and so on (Perry,
1967, chapter 3). In order to dissolve some of the perplexities in
the use of the term and its implications, therefore, it is beneficial
to our understanding of the pupil's well-being to identify its
various characteristics.
When the pupil's well-being is claimed to be the supreme aim
in education, it also embraces some sense of pleasure. And
_when pleasure is recognized and considered as an essential part
of well-being in education, its various notions can be in contrast
and conflict with the other. It is partly due to the notion of
education to be characterized, and partly to the conceptions of
well-being. While there are a number of constituents in the
conceptions of well-being, pleasure must be one of them.
Pleasure is not only concerned with something worthwhile, but
it should also be the hallmark of the outcome of education.
Nevertheless, if pupils' well-being is to be defined in terms of
being in their interests, pleasure is obvtously a necessary
ingredient of their well-being because it promotes their interests.
From these inferences, we can assume two contrasting views
of pupils' well-being. One is that well-being can be defined in a
rather subjective tone, meaning self-determination; whereas the
other defines it as something objectively worthwhile. Of these
contrasting accounts, John White's takes a subjective position,
where pupils' well-being should be defined and understood as
autonomy (White, 1990), characterized in terms of desire-
satisfaction, which I nonetheless categorize into the subjective
account. By contrast, particularly since the 1960's, the intrinsic
worth of certain activities has been considered as the most
important target of education to which pupils are to be brought
up. Perhaps it is rather more significant than other things that
the educational value can be found in certain sorts of activities
(Hirst, 1965; Peters, 1966, chapter 5). Peters's normative
criterion of education links to this (Peters, 1966, chapter 1). This
kind of account should be called and classified as the objective
account for pupils' well-being.
In this paper I shall attempt to dtstinguish pleasure into kinds
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to show that pupils' well-being can be promoted by education,
examining two striking ideas of well-being mentioned above. For
this, an examination shall be taken of the contrasting views of
two philosophers of education, John White and Richard Peters,
on the theme of pleasure.
II. The Sense of Pleasure
In his book Utilitarianism, J. S. Mill defines kinds of pleasure
by distinguishing merely between lower and higher ones, and
thus holds that 'some kinds of pleasure are more desirable and
more valuable than others' (Mill, 1863, 258). Nevertheless, his
concession seems to be insufficient to provide us with the
complete distinction of pleasure and the mistake of circular
thinking has been made by advocating the pursuit of higher
pleasures simply because most sensitive and sensible people do
actually pursue them (Mill, 1863,260-1,288). For me, however,
there should exist certain grounds to distinguish pleasures in
kinds, and that distinction necessitates an explanation of the
reason why some of them can be called higher and others lower.
According to Downie (1966, 69), one reason why Mill fails in the
distinction rests on assuming a hedonistic conception of the
ultimate end. The point of On Liberty is that Mill's qualitative
distinction can be put as a distinction not between pleasures
themselves but between activities. However, some activities are
actually preferable to others. Why do we prefer some to others?
The answer rests on the fact that some activities such as poetry
are conducive to self-development rather than others such as
pushpin (Downie, 1966, 70). This point shows us Mill's second
failure in the distinction. Since, if the distinction is justified by
means of conducing more to self-development, it means
circularly that the distinction depends upon how great a quality
of pleasure is produced (Downie, 1966,71).
Pleasure has had a long history in ethical debates and has
been regarded as a significant part of the good life. Mill's
distinguishing of pleasure into kinds is not novel. Plato had
already been concerned in the Philebus with weighing the
importance of pleasure within the good life, which for him was
related with honour and knowledge, and then goes on to argue
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which one is the best kind of pleasure for the good life. But the
significance of pleasure in its contribution to the good life lies
only in the pursuit of knowledge. Plato tries to classify the
variety of pleasures in his Philebus (20c and 33d). But his
division into kinds of pleasures is based on the distinction of the
ideal life in his Republic (S80d ff.). For Aristotle, pleasures
perfect the activities through which eudaimonia exists. These
pleasure are also of different kinds and correspond to the
different kinds of activities which complete them (Nicomachean
Ethics, Book X, chapter 4). Whereas Plato conceives pleasure as
a certain process or replenishment, Aristotle views it as inherent
in the activities which are made perfect by it. Aristippus placed
even more importance on the pursuit of pleasure by stating that
pleasure is the goal of life. This idea continued through the
Hellenistic age by Epicurus and the Epicurean hedonists. For
Epicurus, pleasure is the end of life at which we are free from
pain during our life-time. This is, however, not an ethical
account but a natural condition, as they assert that if this
natural condition is distorted, pain follows. Pain is a disruption
of the natural condition. Thus there is something more required
for an ethical account of their hedonism (Long, 1986,64).
Because of a weakness of logical link from this Epicurean
natural account to the ethical one, it is required that pleasure be
divided into kinds, and then we can say the hedonistic account
is considered as an ethical one. And their claims that pleasure
should be divided into kinds are, for me, an unsatisfactory
ground for the educational account that education aims at the
good life. It is not only because pleasure often includes
sensations, activities or both, but because it is actually used in
the expression of mixture of emotions and vulgar interests. This
conceptual difficulty denotes that there exist certain objects for
which 'pleasure' is used, physical or psychic. This means the
diversity of pleasure to be captured. If pleasure is taken as an
essential part of the good life which education aims at, the
diversity should be analyzed lest it distort these aims.
III. The Distinction of Pleasure
The distinction of pleasure should be drawn according to what
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provides us with pleasure, i.e., the nature of things that pleasure
is concerned with. For instance, sensual pleasure can be defined
as an absence of pain in the sensory level; whereas some
advantage as an outcome gained can lead us to be pleased, by
which pleasure is seen as certain interests. Finally our enjoying
of an activity, as in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics (Book X,
chapters 1-4), can also be understood as pleasure which always
accompanies certain activities. Pleasures can thus be classified
and defined as follows:
(i) sensual pleasure (Pi): pleasure attained through the
satisfaction of physical desires associated with instinct
and basic needs, which is seen as physiological and
purely composed of the natural properties.
(ii) advantage pleasure (P2): pleasure gained through the
psychological satisfaction and in pursutt of interests in
the ordinary sense. This is not only within the activity
through which amusement and excitement are gained but
in a person's interests, logically irrespective of activity. In
any case, this pleasure is seen as certain advantages
attained.
(iii) achievement pleasure (P3): pleasure seen as a certain
good state achieved through the commitment to certain
activities. This is hypothetically supposed to be a pleasure
inherent in certain activities, and also accompanied, in
Aristotelian sense, with cognitive concerns which require
the conceptual or epistemological apparatus rather than
with the pursuit of material interests. This pleasure rests
on the intrinsic feature of the proper activity. That is to
say, it is impossible to get pleasure without commitment
to certain activities.
As defined above, sensual pleasure (PI) primarily rests at the
physiological level, bodily or corporeal. When we say man
naturally pursues pleasures and avoids pains, it could be
initially understood in the physiological sense. The association
with stimulus and response fo l lowrng psychological
behaviourism could give a theoretical foundation of this
pleasure. For as our body operates automatically, PI therefore
has the physiological autonomy as its paramount feature. For
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instance, homeostasis-is one of the cases. The operation of this
pleasure can be far removed from our rational capacities but can
possibly be controllable by our volition. The Epicurean sense of
pleasure might fall under this category, provided that, as seen
above, pleasure is opposite of pain and regarded as a natural
condition. By this definition, Epicurus also failed in a clear
distinction between kinds of pleasures.
According to Epicurus, advantage pleasure (P2) should be
heterogeneous in that it only exists in the psychological
anticipation and satisfaction under the consideration of our
interests. That is, P2 cannot be explicable by its internal
autonomy in the sense of Platonic pleasure, because it is
composed of the mixed forms of physical and psychological
pleasures. It is relative to the activity with which our vulgar or
lower-order interests are concerned. The pleasure of anticipation
falls under this, i.e., psycho-physical pleasure which Plato
regards as one kind. Unlike Pl this P2 requires certain skill and
ability external to certain activities being carried out. In this
sense, this pleasure is utilitarian if we can judge this as a good
when maximized. While maximizing pleasure is, according to
utilitarians, desirable and thus appreciated as valuable, the
utilitarian position can be justified in the sense of the aggregate
good and only this good is identified with pleasure.
Unlike the physiological autonomy in P 1, achievement pleasure
(P3) requires in its operation the internally autonomous
apparatus accompanying certain activities, and also involves the
epistemological entity that Plato regards as psychic pleasure
iPhllebiis, 31e-32b). Thus we cannot experience this kind of
pleasure at all without a certain mental capacity and an
engaging activity. It is quite adequate to say that P3 necessitates
cognitive perspectives, theoretical and practical, required for
carrying out some activities. Regarding the theoretical
perspectives this pleasure requires a conceptual framework
. whether or not we accept the Platonic view of 'theory'. By
'achievement' I mean that P3 should be accompanied by certain
activities and then our state of mind ultimately reaches a certain
goal by engaging in those activities. If pleasure results from good
fortune as much as successful activity, by contrast, this
pleasure belongs to P2 because of its nature of the advantage
attained. In this sense, P3 is nearer to the pleasure asserted in
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Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics because it is not necessarily
contrasted with mere pain. The aspect of achievement pleasure
is not merely seen as a process (kinesis) that Aristotle focuses
upon. This pleasure involves not only the achievement of certain
activity but also requires certain task for its achievement. Thus
a main characteristic of P3 has a quite different sense of process
from Aristotle's kinesis, which necessarily involves a certain kind
of tasks.
The dtsttnctton above stated shows us that P3 does not
entirely rest on Aristotle's account of pleasure, but we need to
explain the kinesis in the sense of its connection with
'accompanying activities'. There would be a possible distinction
between the activity and the consequential pleasure in the light
of 'kinesis'. The consequential pleasure is derived at the end of
the process of an activity. This has the sense of energia. From
this point, while P2 includes a consequential aspect and
excludes an achievemental one, P3 apprehends the aspects of
activity (energia) as well as its achievement. In Aristotle's sense
of activity, however, pleasure is identical to enjoyment although
enjoyment can be involved in both P2 and P3 (Urmson, 1988,
99). It is a truism that pleasure gained as advantage is provided
by enjoyable activities, and pleasure as achievement also comes
from enjoying activities. Thus distinction among Pl , P2 and P3
does not correspond with that of Aristotle.
While Pl can be seen as some physical responses, such as
ejaculation, i.e., the spurt of basic needs and physiological
desires, P2 rests in the activity effects such as amusement and
excitement derived from play or vocational activity, which
actually improve our vulgar and lower-order interests. The
utilitarian calculus of utility is a good example of P2. Thus the
balance of an amount of utility against another is only possible
in the sense of P2. By contrast P3 does not make any sense in
the light of this calculus. But there is an exception in the sense
of personal utility in that if a pushpin cannot be compatible with
a poem it is obvious that P3 is independent of this kind of
calculus. This is far from Mill's point (1863) since he does not
account for P3 or explain what P3 is although he points out
Benthamite defects with an example of the pushpin.
As regards the mechanism of our capacities, Pl exists through
the physical mechanism outside of activities and concerned with
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our survival because it is derived from the satisfaction of our
basic needs. Meanwhile P2 and P3 are attained through the
psychic mechanism dealing with the nature of activity. Whereas
P2 is based on the psychological mechanisms in the pursuit of
vulgar and lower-order interests such as desire-satisfaction and
rationalization, P3 requires more cognitive concerns and is also
concerned with the states of affairs in our mind. Thus pleasure-
seeking in P3 does not necessarily mean the lower-order
interest-seeking. In this context, P2 requires a psychological
reason for the rationalization as psychological mechanism, and
P3 necessitates the justification of the logical reason in pursuit
of activity, when it is asked 'why should pleasure be pursued?'
In other words, P3 links to the particular feature of certain
activity, but the relation between P2 and activity is a melange
because it includes not only the practical interests but also, on
the other hand, the sense of leisure or even pastime with which
pleasure is internally connected.
IV. Pleasure, Well-being, Education and their Relationship
A. Pleasure and Well-being
Each kind of pleasure has its own meaning for the sense of
well-being whether or not we accept the hedonistic and
utilitarian views. In this paper, the term 'well-being' is identical
to the good life. As a total concept, it has two main sides of the
good life and right life (Particularly on this, see Nagel, 1979).
Nobody denies that pleasure, whatever kind of it, constitutes the
essential part of well-being even though the hedonistic account
of the good life cannot be sustained. Rather it implies the view
that the notion of 'good' is to be defined in terms of pleasure.
The origin of this view is found in Locke's Essay Concerning
Human Understanding. 'Things then are good or evil, only in
reference to pleasure or pain' (Book II, chapter xx, section 2).
Otherwise, some examples that pleasure is a crucial component
of the good life are: 'There is implanted in the human mind a
perfection of pain and pleasure as the chief spring and moving
principles of all its action' (Hume, 1740,1.3.10); and 'Nature has
placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters,
pain and pleasure' (Bentham, 1789,1.1). In any case we cannot
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understand the meaning of the good life unless it involves
pleasure. For instance, the fasting monk does not seek his
sensual pleasure for a considerable time but tries to derive a
certain kind of pleasure for his pursuit of the good life (or maybe
his own perfect life such as self-realization). This cannot be
derived from the physical sense. In this case, he pursues a
certain kind of pleasure as an essential part of well-being.
From this point of view, pleasures in all kinds should be
intrinsic in its own feature. It is perhaps supported by G. E.
Moore that all kinds of pleasures are intrinsically valuable. This
is obvious in his passage:
It is now apparent, on the contrary, that the whole 'enjoyment'
owes its value quite equally to the presence of other
constituents, even though it may be true that pleasure is the
only constituent having any value by itself. (Moore, 1903: 188)
Nevertheless, each intrinsic feature can be distinguishably
characterized. In the case of Pl, well-being is derived from the
cardinal pleasure, whilst P2-regarding well-being is perhaps
concerned with the pursuit of interests. If P2-regarding well-
being is certainly connected with continence or practical wisdom
as virtue, however, we understand the Platonic mean between
the excess and the deficiency or the balance in the utilitarian
calculus as mediocre. Meanwhile P3-regarding well-being lies,
regardless of practical calculus of vulgar and lower-order
interests, in the intrinsic features of particular activities. This is
not affected by a person's arbitrary choice but determined by the
proper achievement of certain activity. In the Buddhist monk's
case again, his P3-regarding well-being is seen in terms of
tranquillity derived from practicing Buddhist charity. It can also
be achieved by means of the strict observance of certain rules as
a logical part of his involvement in the very activity, but it is
never determined by his espoused system of value or his
deliberate calculus of interests. Thus his well-being is explicable
in terms of the achievement which is based on the internal and
particular feature of that activity.
All kinds of pleasures are also connected with welfare, as a
cognate of 'well-being'. The minimal provision and the fulfilment
of some conditions for survival are concerned with the
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satisfaction of P 1, and also welfare policy may be regarded as the
manipulation of the citizen's satisfaction by means of the pursuit
of P2. The cases of P1 and P2 are considered to be the contrary
of virtue, namely incontinence by Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics,
Book VII, chapter 1). More importantly, P2 may be concerned
with the serious matter of justice, if it is a certain social matter
of distribution in the political life. Historically, Aristotle's
remedial and distributive justice as a kind of moral virtue have,
perhaps foremost, dealt with the matter of P2 (Aristotle, 1925,
Book V, chapters 3-4). In modern times, it is obvious that Pl is
something to be satisfied through the remedial treatment and
material provisions such as clothing, food, shelter, etc. and that
P2 is related with work and leisure. That is to say. P2 is involved
in the consideration process of personal interests in the
workplace or amusement resort. and thus it is a matter of
welfare policy concerned with employment, social security. or
even fiscal support for public amenities like the public theatre.
etc.
As defined above, P3 is not a matter of material welfare to
fulfill human basic needs but of universal needs in connection
with something to be achieved. Universal needs are ones that
everyone should fulfill and any person's life is mentally
deteriorated unless these needs are fulfilled. In this sense
education is a sort of welfare. particularly at the level of basic
education. Free and compulsory education can be justified in
the light of this sense. The aim of education, however. does not
necessarily imply the notion of welfare because it is far from the
better state of what people seek or want. Nonetheless some
human activities like education have their own internal features
such as the pursuit of truth, beauty, moral goodness and so on,
which always tend to achieve a certain end-state like a plateau.
The main aim of these activities is obviously to take us to a
better state of affairs, explicable in terms of P3. Thus these
kinds of activities require a distinct and particular logic rather
than others defined in terms of the pursuit of short-term or
lower-order interests. It is therefore our next task to examine
what differences the education in connection with P3 will make.
B. Pleasure and Education
As regards education. each kind of pleasure has its own
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appropriate sense of well-being. For Pl, education should be
able to provide the pupil with the basic requirements present
and future which are a prerequisite condition for her good life. It
might be called a necessary evil that we should consider the
pupil's basic needs, though not our aim to be achieved, since
every person as well as a pupil is entitled to avoid suffering from
a shortage of material resources for the good life. In this sense,
this pleasure is grounded on the substantial needs (Kim, 1996,
77-88)._
Regarding P2, the pupil's short-term or lower-order interests
make sense and put its significance at the crucial centre viewed
from the satisfaction of present desires. Insofar as the term
'interest' is complicatedly used and often contrasted with
'uninterested' referring to the excitement of attention and
CUriosity, P2 takes into an important account of the pupil's well-
being (Kleinig, 1976, 11-2). The Latin etymological sense of
educere emphasizes the pupil's authentic capacity. Recent
progressive trends in education also regard this aspect prior to
content and method over the traditional form of education. On
the other side, the term 'interest' refers to 'benefit', 'profit' or
'good' and thus x refers to the pursuit of the pupil's own good
when it is said that 'x is in the pupil's interests'. For the pupil's
good, however, P2 should be examined at least in the light of two
different senses of 'interest' when we use the ordinary usage 'in
one's interests'. The pupil's interest as a real want should be
dtstinguished from a normative claim for her interests (Berm,
1959/60, 138-40). From the point of the normative view, it is
necessary for the pupil's well-being to give her what is needed,
rather than what she actually wants. Thus P2 should be either
considered as a means to what is good for the pupil or be
reduced to P3 in the sense of the certain achievement taken in
compulsory curriculum. In both cases, there are some
possibilities to undermine the authentic feature in P2.
By contrast, the idea that P2 is to be based on what the pupil
really wants implies that pleasure can be explicable only by her
authentic experience. Authenticity in her experience is a
paramount feature of her own well-being, and can determinate
the genuine achievement accompanied by P3. But the weakness
of this claim is that P2 can be composed of amalgamation of
various wants and desires that the pupil actually desires, and,
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as Plato points out, of a mixed type of pleasures. Pleasure as an
essential ingredient of the pupil's well-being necessarily includes
not only what she desires but also what is valuable
independently of what she actually wants. This is, as Berm
asserts, 'not because a desire has been disappointed but
because a well-grounded claim has been overruled' (Benn, 131).
P3 seems to be concerned with a well-grounded claim of its
value perhaps in the case of liberal education. The idea of liberal
education initially aims at freeing our mind from error, illusion,
prejudice and so on (Hirst, 1965), which are also seen as
notoriously contrasted with our genuine pursuit of pleasure. In
this sense liberal education can provide us with pleasure that we
regard as an essential ingredient to well-being. Nevertheless we
can raise a serious problem whether liberal education is in
accord with P3 if it is to be defined by the nature of knowledge
as Hirst claims (Hirst, 1965). Plato also sees 'pleasure' as a
means to the goal of knowledge, and true pleasure can be found
in terms of the pursuit of knowledge in his Philebus (63d).
Regarding this problem I shall attempt to examine what is
educationally worthwhile for the pupil's well-being in terms of
pleasure.
V. White on Pleasure
So far I have shown three distinct kinds of pleasure and their
particular features. According to the distinction, well-being can
be defined in different ways. In education, if its task is focused
on the pupil's well-being, its significance can be notably weighed
in terms of the particular features of pleasure, as contemporary
philosophers of education suggest, though without directly
arguing on pleasure. In these following sections, White and
Peters shall be examined as regards the theme of pleasure so
that we can suggest what kind of pleasure in education should
be taken into account rather than others.
White does not directly argue on pleasure in connection with
personal well-being or vice versa, except where he states
physical pleasure (White, 1990, 122). Rather his account of
autonomy in terms of desire-satisfaction seems to seek
alternatively the non-hedonistic way of understanding the
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identification of well-being with happiness (White, 1982, 32). In
this section I shall try to demonstrate: [i] White's claim of
autonomy, so far as it is defined in terms of desire-satisfaction
account, rests on advantage pleasure (P2), if we accept pleasure
as a necessary part of well-being. And [ii] desire-satisfaction
account such as White's claim has an educational difficulty to
improve the pupil's well-being, not because we undermine the
significance of autonomy, that is to say, the autonomous life is a
logical part.of.an.enlightened (or educated) person's conception
of the good life, but because it faces the practical peculiarity that
activities in education imply when applied to the educational
practice. It is not my intention to argue in this paper that certain
inconsistency with autonomy is not coherent with real account
of autonomy as White mentions almost all the possible
objections (White, 1982, 40-2; 47ff), but I shall tackle his
argument in connection with the matter of pleasure.
As to the first problem, why does a philosopher such as White
try to identify personal well-being with the scheme of desire-
satisfaction? There would be several merits with this. First of all,
the actual desire or desire-satisfaction could be appreciated as
worthwhile, only if it is concerned with our autonomy. Related to
this, the liberal idea supports the autonomy claim where
autonomy is defined as an essential part of personal well-being
in terms of desire-satisfaction if the pupil concerned is regarded
enlightened. White above all recognizes desire-satisfaction as the
core for the pupil's future life-plan. According to him, we must
structure out our future to some extent and according to some
scheme of priorities (White, 1982, 42). It seems appropriate to
say that we are autonomous to have a certain structure of our
desires in a liberal society. Nevertheless there still remains a
serious problem as to what we desire for our future life.
If what is desired is to be 'desirable', we have to elucidate what
we actually desire. It is a clich Meno (82b-85b) does not really
desire to know what the diagonal mathematically means
because he is in a state of ignorance, namely, he does not know
what he really desires or what he may have to know. By this is
meant that we are seeking certain advantages or good results as
we anticipate the future. In this process, there are required
some conceptual apparatus for dissolving the difficulty involved
in the problem of desire-satisfaction. I dub this apparatus
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'would-be-desirable' as an intermediate between 'what is actually
desired' and 'what is really desirable' (Kim, 1996: 99-103; 275-
80). The notion of 'would-be-desirable' enables us to calculate
what is in our interests during our lifetime. When we tackle the
'desire-satisfaction' scheme with 'would-be-desirable', therefore,
the scheme links to advantage pleasure.
On the subjective account side of well-being, autonomy can be
evaluated as the supreme value in a liberal society since this
society presumes the individualistic value. Insofar as autonomy
is identified with personal well-being as White apprehends, the
pleasure concerned in this context must be P2. His autonomy
claim depends upon advantage pleasure, amongst others, which
each individual seeks in the process of considering one's
interests. For White, if personal well-being is defined in terms of
desire-satisfaction, however, pleasure is seen as an outcome
from desire-satisfaction and autonomy means the attainment of
power in the sense of self-decision that enables us to achieve
what one wants. This is a mistake. If well-being is defined as
desire-satisfaction and pleasure arises from this scheme, there
is no room for the fact that we can recognize our well-being
where we have no desire. In the Meno (Loc. cit.), for instance, the
slave boy comes to understand a geometrical truth during the
dialogue with Socrates, even if he does not desire the truth.
Against this, White says that autonomy is a way of regulating
one's lower-order desires by the higher-order desires of one's
choosing.
Autonomous people learn in this kind of way to bring their
lower-order desires under higher-order and more global
desires of their own choosing. (White, 1990, 84)
But his assertion needs to be examined in two ways. How can
we possess the higher-order desires that regulate the lower-
order ones? And is it really true that the higher-order desires
can be determined by one's own choice? If this is true, we need
to define what characteristics the higher-order desires have.
There is no attempt for White to answer this.
What is the difference between the higher-order and the lower-
order desires, if both are determined by one's own choice? Here,
the higher-order (or global) desires seem to be the agent's own
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picture for her life. But the self-picture requires some objective
ground to make itself up, not any kind of desires. In education,
moreover, it is still not obvious what makes the pupil have her
own picture and what plays the role of responsibility which the
pupil gradually takes over for her life. If the higher-order desires
bring the pupil her self-picture, it falls viciously into the circular
reasoning trap. What makes the self-picture require more than
the higher-order desires? The prior concern should be on what
makes people self-directed if to be autonomous is agreed to be
self-directed. This is an educational difficulty in the autonomy
claim by White.
As for this difficulty, we may have to explain that all children
do not desire the worthwhile state of affairs or mind. The
following statements would be helpful to examine what they
actually desire.
(i) All children can desire as what they actually desire.
[it) All children can desire some desirability as the form
appreciated by themselves as desirable.
The statement of (i) would be regarding a state of mind; that of
(ii) a state of affairs (Griffin, 1986, 7-10). But Griffin's distinction
seems to me to be relevant only if it is considered under the
utilitarian scheme as he puts it. In any case, neither [l) nor (ii)
provides them with a logical link to the worthwhile state of
affairs or mind, except the case that their own choice from the
desire-satisfaction scheme should be respected under the liberal
idea. The statement (i) could lead them to the wrong way of life
such as alcoholism, self-indulgence and covetousness; whereas
some preference to desirability can throw light on what is to be
desirable for their well-being, but this kind of preference does
not itself make sure of what is really desirable for their lives. In
either sense of these, pleasure rests on the consequence from
desire-satisfaction. In other words, preference requires
something more than merely a psychological account of desire in
order that it be proved as a desirable thing. Thus the scheme of
desire-satisfaction such as in White's claim of autonomy itself
presupposes certain pleasure-seeking.
Related with [Il}, I will examine his claim in the light of
educational aim. If autonomy is to be seen as an educational
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aim, we need to explore the meaning of becoming an
autonomous person, when education aims at bringing up an
autonomous person. In fact we cannot directly teach the pupil to
be autonomous, but we can impart to the pupil some skill and
knowledge which are necessarily required for becoming
autonomous. This is the same problem as the difficulty of moral
education because of the difficulty that becoming autonomous is
a matter of character formation. We cannot directly teach the
pupil to be moral and by the same token to be autonomous, but
merely impart to the pupil moral knowledge and skill so as to be
moral. To dissolve the difficulty in becoming autonomous, we
first of all have to examine the meaning of 'being good'.
'Being good' also implies two senses (Straughan. 1982, 12).
One is purely moral, and the other is concerned with 'well-
doing'. The moral sense of being good is concerned with moral
goodness and implies the formation of character, disposition,
and habits. Meanwhile, in the sense of being good at something,
being good implies to possess certain abilities, skills, knowledge,
and understanding. Certainly the latter sense can also involve
moral knowledge and understanding and moral skills and
manners. Moral education makes sense in this context. Moral
character, habit, disposition and so on are to be taught only in
terms of moral skills and manners as well as moral knowledge
and understanding. To say, we teach the pupil moral knowledge
and get her acquainted with skills and manners in order to bring
up moral judgment, and then we can appreciate whether the
pupil is moral or not. As for this, Straughan distinguishes three
forms of teaching: teaching-that, teaching-how and teaching-to
(Straughan, 1982, 83-92). Teaching-that is concerned with
information and knowledge; teaching-how is about how to form
moral rules so that the pupil can get to attain moral abilities,
skills and principles for moral judgments; and teaching-to is the
methodological matter of character formation for becoming
moral agents by means of judgment to be taught. We can
abstract some educational implications from these. Teaching-
that is prior to teaching-how in that some knowledge and
understanding are required in order to attain some skills and
abilities. From this, the distinction of kriowrng-t.hat and
knowing-how are necessary but not sufficient for being a moral
agent as a cognate of teaching to be moral. Straughan says in
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connection with moral education:
If moral education is not to remain a wholly 'theoretical
enterprise, it cannot shut its eyes to the problems of teaching
to. (Such teaching cannot consist simply of the transmission
of knowledge and skills. (Straughan, 1982, 92)
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The problem here is to bridge the gap between teaching-
that/how and teaching-to. It is extremely difficult to become
autonomous through education. Insofar as we cannot directly
bring up the pupil to be autonomous, we have to seek another
method to teach the pupil to be autonomous, unless teaching
skills and abilities as well as knowledge run parallel with
teaching to be autonomous.
With educational difficulty in the autonomy claim, it is our
next task to examine the problem of what makes children
informed, if autonomy is explicable for the informed desire-
satisfaction scheme, as White asserts. First of all it is not easily
agreed that the structure of desires directly provides the criteria
for the informed desires, but, for me, what makes us
autonomous is not dependent on the scheme of desire-
satisfaction itself. This requires certain objective desirability. As
for this, we need to argue about a 'desirable consciousness'. If all
other things called good are only means to the end of making
conscious life better or more desirable, according to Sidgwick
(1907, 398), it can imply that they are means to an end of
happiness. As he points out, we face some difficulties that
'nothing is desirable except desirable feeling' and that 'the
desirability of each feeling is only directly cognisable by the
sentient individual at the time of feeling it' (Loc. cit.), or the
ultimate good can be recognized only in a subjective way. But is
there only the subjective way to recognize desirability? Sidgwick
dtsttngutshes the desirability of feeling from feeling in relation
with 'knowing mind to the object known which is implied in the
term "true" or "valid cognition'" which is seen to be an element of
consciousness quite neutral in respect of desirability (Loc. cit.).
Thus he admits that certain state of consciousness such as
'Cognition of Truth, Contemplation of Beauty, Volition to realise
Freedom or Virtue', is not preferred as the present
consciousness itself but as future consciousness that will be
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foreseen to give some- effects or be recognized in the objective
relations of the conscious being (Sidgwick, 1907, 399). This
shows us that our preferences have been mistaken when we are
considering our life-plan or autonomous plan under the scheme
of desire-satisfaction. Thus our preference should lie in 'the
relation between the mind and something else which, as the very
notion of "truth" implies, is whatever it is independently of our
cognition of it' (Loc. cit.), which I think is objective.
It is rather important to note that we accept the preference of
conformity to virtue or contemplation of beauty, and to a state of
consciousness recognized as more pleasant. This rests on an
ideal to some extent objective and valid for all minds (Sidgwick,
-1907,400). The argument so far provides the ground to make us
move to the objective account of well-being as well as the fact
that what makes us informed should be taken into account
whenever we try to explain well-being in terms of the desire-
satisfaction scheme.
VI. Peters on Pleasure
Unless the educational value is defined in terms of the
subjective idea of well-being, we need to inquire into a problem
as to whether the objective account possibly improves the pupil's
well-being and it also involves pleasure. For this I will go on to
argue Peters's point on worthwhile activities.
For Peters, I assume, P3 should be more seriously taken into
account of the pupil's well-being. He distinguishes between
activity and mere performance. His position of it would be
analogous to Aristotle's distinction for pleasure between kinesis
(process) and energia (activity) (Nicomachean Ethics, Book X,
chapters 1-4). Above all he admits that pleasure can link to our
sensations and emotional states as well as activities (Peters,
1966: 151). The important things lie in the following: to maintain
that something should be chosen or done for the sake of
pleasure can be identified with maintaining the intrinsic worth
in activity (Peters, 1966, 148). Something done for the sake of
pleasure, however, denies the instrumentality of what is to be
done in relation to some further reason or the deontic reason
that it is to be done out of duty (Peters, 1966, 150). The
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something done for the sake of pleasure can be the way to
guarantee the intrinsic worth in activity. Some activity such as
taking opium or cocaine can nonetheless be pursued for the
sake of pleasure. Against this Peters asserts that 'it is impossible
to characterize this without reference to the characteristics of
the activity' (Peters, 1966, 149).
For Peters as well as for Aristotle, an activity is not to be
pursued for the extrinsic outcome of it. But there is a different
point of.Peters from that of Aristotle. In order to understand an
educationally worthwhile activity, we need to distinguish
between achievement and task within the category of activity.
Further to this distinction, Peters has earlier argued the criteria
of 'education' where he demonstrates that 'education' is a task
term as well as an achievement term, suggesting some difference
between 'education' and the Rylean achievement term (Peters,
1966, chapter 1). The distinction throws light on the fact that
pleasure involved in educationally worthwhile activity should be
P3. Pleasure in an activity can involve not only achievement of it
but it also requires certain task for it. That is to say, Peters's
pleasure in worthwhile activities involves the different sense of
task or process from Aristotle's kinesis. The term 'for the sake of
pleasure' can be sometimes understood as the term for pleasure-
seeking, even if it indicates, as we have shown, the intrinsic
worth in an activity. It seems to me, however, that Peters's
pleasure cannot be interpreted for pleasure-seeking so far as the
sense of pleasure depends upon the nature of the activity. It is
helpful for us to note that Aristotle's contrast between kinesis
and energia is also analogous to that between poiesis
(production) and praxis (practice in the sense of activity or
action).
As for this some notes should be taken further. Insofar as
Peters's pleasure is seen as P3, first of all, 'pleasure-seeking' is a
consequential term of which the meaning lies outside of the
activity concerned. In this manner, poiesis is a term used for a
certain outcome that the agent anticipates after carrying out a
performance. Thus pleasure-seeking cannot be a part of the
activity concerned. Secondly, 'pleasure-seeking' or 'kinesis' can
be a term used for a certain performance regarded as an
instrumental means to it. Even if pleasure is promoted by means
of a certain performance, it is not always identical to the
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pleasure that has been intended in the pleasure-seeking. Rather
pleasure-seeking is nearer to P2, which is, as I have already
shown, a pleasure gained as a certain advantage or outcome.
Educationally worthwhile activities cannot be appreciated in
terms of the forms of desire-satisfaction or pleasure-seeking.
Educational worth is rather considered as something worthwhile
after certain activities, no matter how far the pupil has not
recognized their value before engaging in them.
For Peters, worthwhile activities have ornamental value. By
ornamental value, I mean the intrinsic worth where theoretical
activities are pursued, prior to the practical needs, namely
immediate satisfaction of needs. This does not lie in the
'education for life' but in 'the life for education'.
There is an important sense in which 'life', by which is usually
meant that which goes on outside the class-room, is for the
sake of education, not education for life. (Peters, 1963, 57)
It seems to me that education for life is concerned with P2 but
life for education, more exactly speaking, theoretical life for
education is concerned with P3. Here, some worth for well-being
can be definitely found in the pursuit of theoretical activities,
and has its own intrinsic motivation that is valued as its own
internal logic. Thus the intrinsic worth inherent in theoretical
activities are for their own sake.
Further to P3, educational value should be characterized in
terms of certain perfect achievement but not defined in the form
of desire-satisfaction since the scheme of desire-satisfaction is in
the danger of pleasure-seeking. About this, Bond says:
We cannot be happy unless we endeavour to be good; mere
pleasure-seeking cannot lead to happiness. We have reason,
therefore, first to strive for excellence and only then to seek
pleasure. (Bond, 1983, 122)
To enable education to bring about good consequences, we
should at least pursue certain perfection in terms of
achievement and recognize that P3 is above all to be attained in
education as is necessary for the pupil's well-being. The good
consequences here need not be identical to the utilitarian or
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consequentialist claim but to a certain aspect of achievement
attained through the pupil's own commitment to certain
activities and endeavour in the process of learning and
schooling. Only when this point has been taken, we can have the
ground for the meaningful sense of P3. Otherwise it is still too
far from the pupil's own well-being: as Plato asserts, the sense of
pleasure, like in the theory of Idea, goes beyond our worldly
experiences. or as the subjectiVists like to assert, the sense of
pleasure falls under the inner-mind experience without objective
standards we can fairly assume in the educational context.
VII. Concluding Remarks
So far I have shown that pleasure is to be distinguished in
terms of its nature and is so much an essential part of one's
well-being that education should be focused on the improvement
of pleasure in any kind of way. for education aims at something
valuable defined in terms of one's well-being. Particularly two
kinds of pleasure have been taken into account although many
kinds of pleasure can contribute to one's well-being and their
harmony has significance in the process of education. P2 in
terms of the desire-satisfaction scheme may be involved in the
process of education. but has somewhat of a capricious aspect
in the sense of the achievement of valuable states we regard as
the educational aim. On the other hand, P3 is obViously far from
the pupil's experience in the present stage while she is engaged
in the process of learning and schooling, but throws light on
what she virtually attains and achieves. This is not merely a
problem we should tackle by means of the dichotomy between
subjective and objective accounts but we also need an
alternative solution for the improvement of the pupil's well-being
when we try to explain it in terms of pleasure. By an alternative
solution I mean a normative reason for the pupil's action that we
always have in mind in the educational situation. In this aspect
P3 has a more relevant sense than P2.
In sum. pleasure implied in the pupil's well-being through
education should be P3. and education should aim at something
valuable beyond desire-satisfaction. This provides us with the
ground to accept Peters's sense of pleasure rather than White's.
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This is supported by the first sentence of the Analects if we can
imagine why Confucius gives it to us as the prime precept.
The Master said, To learn and at due times to repeat what one
has learnt, is not after all a pleasure? Analects (I-I)
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